Industrial Organization （ECON 4013）
经济学economics代写 Suppose Panasonic is the first-mover, draw the game in extensive form (with the game tree stretching from top to bottom).
Assignment 2 经济学economics代写
Due: November/December, 2018
1.(15%) Consider the following game:
a.(5%) Suppose Panasonic is the first-mover, draw the game in extensive form (with the game tree stretching from top to bottom).
b.(5%) What is/are the Nash Equilibrium/Equilibria of this game? Briefly explain.
c.(5%) What is the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of this game? Briefly explain.
2.(20%) A duopoly has a market demand of P = 36-3Q and the two firms are identical in that they face constant marginal cost of 18. Find the Cournot Equilibrium market price and output, firms’ quantities and profits. 经济学economics代写
3.(15%) If the duopolists decided to engage in tacit collusion, what are the market price and, firms’ quantities and profits?
4.(25%) Now suppose the duopolists are to interact in an infinitely repeated game. They agreed to collude and would use trigger strategy (by way of Cournot competition) to retaliate any defection. Find the discount rate ithat can sustain collusion in this setting. [Find the profit from defection using the reaction functions in Q2].
5.(25%) Now consider Q2 with the game becoming a Stackelberg one. Firm A is the first-mover and B the follower. Their MC are 18 and 16 respectively. Find the market price and output, the firms’ quantities and profits.
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