ECON2070 Introduction to Strategic Thinking Metin Uyanık
Tutorial #11 Questions
Semester 1, 2021
加拿大经济学代考 Player 2 is uncertain whether player 1’s cost of building is high or low, while player 1 knows her own cost. The payoffffs are depicted below.
Question 1. 加拿大经济学代考
Consider the following Bayesian game where
∈ (0, 12) and there are two states of the world.
(a) Suppose both players attach 
to each of the two states (hence no player knows the states of the world, i.e., each player has only one type). Find the set of all Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game.
(b) Suppose now player 2 knows the state while player 1 attaches to each of the two states. Find the set of all Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game.
Question 2. 加拿大经济学代考
Consider an industry with two fifirms: an incumbent (player 1) and a potential entrant (player 2). Player 1 decides whether to build a new plant, and simultaneously player 2 decides whether to enter. Player 2 is uncertain whether player 1’s cost of building is high or low, while player 1 knows her own cost. The payoffffs are depicted below.
(a) Defifine Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this game.
(b) Find the Nash equilibria of this game.
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